not only comparative but also interdisciplinary, for it examines the work of lawyers from the perspective of labour economics. We explore the impact on damages of adopting a USA approach which uses more detailed labour market information and a more precise method of calculation. In particular, increased attention is paid, first, to the way in which earnings change over a working lifetime and, secondly, to the extent that future employment prospects are adversely affected by injury. The result is an "alternative" award of compensation which explicitly incorporates labour market information and appropriate statistical methods to predict future earnings according to the impact of injury on employment.
The alternative method of calculation is applied to a sample of adjudicated cases to identify the practical effect of the difference in approach. Obtaining access to solicitors files throughout England and Wales, we have analysed over a hundred cases involving loss of future earnings which were judicially disposed of between 1990 and 1998. Data have been collected about the factors relevant to the determination of future earnings loss for each claimant including, for example, work history, education and the impact of injury. The actual damages awarded in each of these cases has been broken down into its component parts and the award for earnings loss has been compared with that which would have been obtained if the alternative method of assessment had been used. The study is thus given an important empirical focus. This research breaks new ground by being the first to examine the effect of different methods used to calculate damages for future loss of earnings in the context of the detailed background of decided cases.
Lawyers can find some reassurance in certain findings from the survey of decided cases. In general, the courts are consistent in their calculation of damages.
We find the relationships one might expect between the size of the award, the severity of the injury, the claimant's age and other earnings-related characteristics. 2 Furthermore, we find no statistical evidence of judicial bias in respect of sex, race, types of injury, or part of the country in which the case is heard. However, the comparison of adjudicated awards with those calculated on a basis similar to the labour economics approach used in the USA produces a sharp critique of the British system. According to this alternative method of calculation claimants in this country generally have been under-compensated, some substantially so, in terms of the accepted aims of the damages award. We found 88 per cent of claimants in our sample under-compensated by the court method. Over half of these would have received an award at least 50 per cent greater under the alternative calculation. For a third, the award calculated by the alternative method was at least double the court award. These findings do not necessarily mean that the article should be read as supporting a substantial rise in damages awards. Instead we emphasise only that the tort system fails to satisfy one of its main objectives in that it does not provide "full" compensation. The rhetoric of the system is not matched by its reality.
Within the aggregate findings produced by the survey, there are some important variations including a gender and age effect and an effect conditional on post-injury employment capacity. Consistently we found that younger claimants, male claimants and those with post-injury employment potential were particularly disadvantaged by the court method. The claimant who is a young man and is still capable of some work after his injury is thus especially likely to be undercompensated.
An important reason for the difference between the court and the alternative award is that courts under-estimate the growth in earnings over a claimant's working life. There are two sources of such earnings growth. The first arises from productivity growth which is related to the individual's own experience in the labour market and the second results from an economy-wide upward trend in productivity over time. It is this under-estimation of earnings growth which explains why younger claimants, who have more of their working life ahead of them, have been particularly disadvantaged by the court method. The gender variation in the differential is more complicated. Although both women and men are equally undercompensated for the expected growth in their lifetime earnings, women are overcompensated with regard to their expected future participation in the labour market.
Because of childcare responsibilities, on average, women's employment over their working lifecycle is less than that of men. The court method of calculation makes insufficient allowance for this lower participation rate with the result that, for women of child-bearing age at least, the under-estimation of earnings growth is partly offset by the over-estimation of the likelihood of future employment.
A second major reason for the difference between the court and alternative awards is that courts generally under-compensate claimants if they have a residual disability arising from their injury which is not sufficient to preclude future employment. Courts consistently under-estimate the adverse effects of disability on post-injury employment, and consequently on post-injury future earnings potential.
Our alternative method of calculation makes use of labour market information about the employment histories of disabled workers and, in doing so, makes greater allowance for the impact of disability on the likelihood of future employment.
We begin this article by providing a general background to the way in which the courts currently assess loss of earnings in England and Wales. We then outline the approach in the USA where the standard tools of labour economics are used to determine the value of loss of future earnings. This approach forms the basis of our alternative method. We provide a detailed example of the approach by applying it to one of the cases in our sample of adjudicated decisions. Finally, we move from the specific to the general by reporting the overall results of calculating alternative awards for each of the cases in our sample and comparing them with the compensation actually awarded by the courts. Although the main findings of the study are described here, only an outline can be given, for example, of the methods used in the USA and of the alternative constructed by the authors for use in this country. Further details together with accompanying statistical tables are to be found in associated publications, including the working papers submitted to the ESRC.
3

THE METHOD USED BY THE COURTS TO ASSESS DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
The often stated aim of an award of damages is to return the injured person, as far as possible, to the financial position which existed before the accident took place. 4 This aim is made all the more difficult by the requirement that damages be paid in a once-and-for-all lump sum. 5 Like is not being replaced with like because a continuing loss of income is compensated by a capital sum. 6 In addition, the finality of the award means that there is little possibility of obtaining more money if circumstances change after the settlement or trial has been concluded. 7 As a result, the forecasts made by judges of what may happen to the claimant in the future, and about the financial world in which the claimant will have to live, are crucial components of the damages assessment.
Judges themselves have acknowledged that traditionally they have made these estimates and forecasts by using a combination of precedent and intuition. 7 For a discussion of the exceptional cases where interim or provisional damages are sought see Lewis, op cit chapter 3.
8 " [T] he judge adopts an intuitive process buttressed by reference to previously decided cases. These cases partly operate as reference points whose features are compared with those of the case under consideration and partly from the basis of a general climate of opinion on the proper multiplier in a particular class of case with which a judge of long experience in the field will be entirely familiar." Mustill LJ in Cunningham v. Camberwell Health Authority [1990] 2 Med LR 49 at 52.
justifying their position on the basis that they are required to determine damages on the particular facts of a case and, since averages by construction do not take account of these facts, they cannot form the basis of the award. 9 In the absence of statistical guidance, there has been potential for inaccuracy and inconsistency. In recent years the bases upon which the judicial forecasts have been made have been increasingly exposed as subjective and divorced from the realities of the financial world. Kemp describes the process as having been arbitrary, and lacking in both precision and logic. 10 In response, both the legislature and the judiciary have made important changes to the method for calculating damages. However, as we shall see, the present study reveals that important aspects of the calculation continue to be based upon assumptions which are unnecessarily arbitrary.
Based on these judicial forecasts, the lump sum award for future loss of earnings is intended to compensate exactly for the income stream that would have been available to the claimant in the future. Lawyers employ two key concepts in making the calculation: first, they assess the net annual loss of earnings, known as the multiplicand; and second, they make an allowance for the period of years during which that earnings loss is expected to continue. This second element produces the multiplier by which the multiplicand is to be increased in order to arrive at the total 9 "The exercise upon which the court has to embark is one which is inherently unscientific … average life expectancy can be actuarially ascertained, but to assess the probability of future political, economic and fiscal policies requires not the services of an actuary or an accountant but those of a prophet. sum to be paid for the loss of earnings. Both of these elements are examined in more detail.
The Multiplicand
The multiplicand is the annual loss of earnings assessed at the date of trial.
Account is taken of the difference between future pre-injury net earnings and future post-injury net earnings. If at the time of injury the claimant is not working because of unemployment, or some other reason, the court constructs a figure for what might have been earned in the future if no injury had occurred. It does this by using the published data on average earnings such as is available annually in the New Earnings Survey. Where the claimant is in work at the time of injury, future preinjury earnings are measured by the claimant's earnings at the time of injury plus any earnings growth to the date of trial. Of crucial importance to the present study is that, in general, unless there is a clear prospect of advancement, no allowance is made for potential growth in real earnings after the date of trial. The traditional reason for this is that the increase is too speculative to make allowance for it.
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It is even more difficult to estimate what the claimant will earn after his injury than it is to estimate what he would have earned had he not been injured.
Speculative though the exercise is, an allowance must be made for these future postinjury earnings. The most straightforward cases are those where the claimant is judged to be medically incapable of future employment for then no calculation is required and full loss of pre-injury earnings can be awarded. However, if evidence indicates that the claimant is capable of employment in the future, only a partial loss can be awarded, and the court must then try to assess the value of future post-injury earnings. If the claimant is working at the time of trial, this assessment will be based upon his actual earnings. However, where the claimant is not working but is judged to be capable of doing so in the future, the court makes an estimate based upon the average earnings for an occupation which the claimant will be able to perform. For example, the average earnings for lift operators and car park attendants are often used where an injured male was formerly an unskilled manual worker but is only capable of sedentary employment after his injury.
The Multiplier and the Discounts
The multiplier converts the future stream of lost income into an immediate capital sum. Where the stream of income involves earnings rather than, for example, the proceeds of a pension or future care costs, the multiplier reflects the number of years between the date of the trial and the predicted date of retirement from work.
This number of years is discounted to allow for several factors with the result that, for example, an injury to a young person causing a 40 year earnings loss produces a multiplier of, at most, only 24. There are three main reasons for making such a discount:-(1) The first reason takes into account the fact that the claimant receives, and is able to invest, the damages long before he would have been paid the wages had he not been injured. This accelerated receipt, and the associated investment return, justifies the discount. Until recently the level of discount was based on a presumption which, to the surprise of many in the financial world, remained unchanged for over a quarter of a century. This was that a real rate of return (over and above inflation and liability to tax) could be obtained amounting to 4.5 per cent a year. It was not until the House of Lords case of Wells v Wells 12 that this discount rate was reduced to 3 per cent. The Lord Chancellor has since used legislative powers to reduce the rate to 2.5 per cent. 13 The effect of these two changes has been to increase damages so that, for example, a claimant with a forty year loss now receives about a third more, and a claimant suffering a fifteen year loss receives about a seventh more.
(2) The second reason for a discount is that allowance should be made for the risk of the claimant's premature death. 
Handicap In The Labour Market and Smith v Manchester Awards
The effects of the accident may be such that the claimant may find it more difficult to retain his post-injury employment and, compared to others, may encounter more problems in obtaining new work in the future. Where these risks are significant, in addition to the usual multiplier-multiplicand assessment, a lump sum may be awarded for this weakening in the claimant's competitive position in the labour market. The award is known as a Smith v Manchester payment, being named after the case in which the principles were first established. 23 Court practice in making such an assessment is to adopt a "broad brush" approach, 24 one judge suggesting that a lump sum was plucked from the air. 25 However, subject to 22 Haberman and Bloomfield op cit. Specifically, the conventional approach to the estimation of future working life is based upon a single lifetime entry transition into the labour force and a single lifetime exit transition from the labour force, a unimodal (single peaked) curve of age-specific activity and unemployment rates, and the omission of current labour market states as a predictor of subsequent transitions. Recent Labour Force Surveys coupled with a Markov chain methodology allow for more accurate estimation of future working life on the basis of status-dependent multiple transitions. exceptions, it appears that most judges make conventional awards of between 6 and 24 months' earnings.
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THE ASSESSMENT OF LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS IN THE USA
In awarding damages for loss of future earnings in the USA the courts do not use the technical terms multiplier and multiplicand but they do use some of the concepts upon which those terms are based. For example, lifetime earnings are based upon earnings at the time of trial and the future stream of earnings is discounted by the real rate of interest available on the lump sum. In these respects the basic elements of the computation process are broadly similar. However, in the USA, the courts are more ready to embrace the results of labour market analysis to predict future patterns of earnings and employment. It is not the case that there is an agreed method of incorporating this information but rather several variants on a common theme. A stylised version of the calculation is presented below which is based upon our discussions with the National Association of Forensic Economists and on their surveys of their members' practices.
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In the USA, the calculation comprises a four-stage procedure:
(1) Base earnings are estimated in the same way as in the UK, that is, by relying on the claimant's earnings at the time of injury plus any growth to the time of trial. (4) Finally, the resulting lifetime sum is discounted for early receipt in order to obtain a capitalised present value.
Where the claimant has post-injury future employment capacity, this fourstage procedure is repeated to calculate the present value of post-injury future earnings. In this calculation base earnings, earnings growth and employment risks take into account the effects of residual disability. A fifth stage involves the subtraction of the present value of the lifetime sum of post-injury earnings from the present value of the sum of pre-injury earnings.
In focusing upon the differences in approach between the USA and the method currently used in this country, it is the second, third and fifth stages of these calculations which we consider: namely the measurement of wage growth and of expected working life and the impact of residual disability on both of these.
Wage Growth
There are two components to individual wage growth: the first arises as a result of individual age-related productivity growth and the second as a result of Slesnick, "A 1996 Study of 'Prevailing Practice' in Forensic Economics" (1997) 10 (1) J Forensic Economics 1.
economy-wide productivity growth. The age-related element arises because earnings are positively related to human capital which is accumulated either during years of formal education and training or as a result of labour market experience. The profile of earnings over the course of an individual's working life (the "age-earnings profile") is increasing but at an ever decreasing rate as the individual gets older.
Age-earnings profiles are used routinely by forensic economists in the USA, and ultimately the courts, to predict the path of future earnings in personal injury cases.
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Age-earnings profiles are measured in one of two ways: either, more broadly, by a cross-tabulation of the average level of earnings for groups of employees at various age intervals by sex and education level; or, more accurately, 29 by estimating earnings equations which take into account precise age and a wider set of personal characteristics including race, marital status, employment history, current occupation and so on. In spite of the potential for bias associated with age-earnings profiles derived from cross-section data these continue to be commonly used to measure individual wage growth in the USA. receive compensation in respect of either age-related or economy-wide earnings growth.
Expected Working Life
To calculate future loss of earnings, the number of years the individual would have been in employment if the injury had not occurred must be measured. This is not simply the number of years until the claimant would have reached statutory retirement age because some people leave and re-enter the labour market, some people leave before, or work beyond, the statutory retirement age and some people die before their retirement. The most common solution to this problem in personal injury trials in the USA is to use statistics published in the worklife tables. These tables are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 33 and provide an estimate of the number of years an individual of a stated age is expected to remain in the workforce until "final separation" either because of retirement or death. The BLS tables are calculated using the probabilities of movement into and out of the labour force for people of a particular age.
While the use of these tables has the benefit of being simple to apply, it has been the subject of criticism at the theoretical level. The objections concern the uneven spread of periods of inactivity over an individual's working life and the fact that future labour market activity is conditional on past and current labour market status. These criticisms have led to a number of modifications being made. Becker's approach is of particular value when constructing a model for use in the UK.
AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF CALCULATION
We set out an alternative method for determining loss of future earnings in this country which draws heavily on the USA practices described above. We use labour market data drawn from UK sources to construct age-earnings profiles and, in The total loss over a working lifetime is the sum of annual losses in each year until retirement. To achieve a capitalised sum this total is discounted by a real rate of interest.
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There is an additional element to the calculation where the claimant has postinjury employment potential. Post-injury earnings, adjusted for the likelihood of employment, are calculated in the same way as pre-injury earnings and are then subtracted from the pre-injury earnings. For year 1 the calculation is as follows: 
Estimating the Age-Earnings Profile
The path of future earnings growth (G) depends upon how earnings increase a is the conditional post-injury employment rate in each year i, Life i is the probability of survival in each remaining year of working life and r is the rate of discount. theory, having a disability is thought to reduce a worker's marginal product and thus earnings. Where the injured individual is still capable of work, but may be limited in the amount or type of work that can be done, this lower post-injury earnings potential must be reflected in the age-earnings profile.
We estimate age-earnings profiles using data for a representative sample of 60,000 households contained in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). These data are the most comprehensive source of labour market information currently available in the UK. The survey is undertaken four times in any one year and we pool the four quarters of the 1996 LFS and the first quarter of the 1997 LFS. This gives us a total sample of around 22,000 men and 23,000 women for whom we have information on earnings, age, sex, disability, current and past employment statuses and, for those in employment, their occupation. The information about earnings is derived from questions relating to the last usual pay received and the relevant payment period from which we calculate real weekly earnings. The information about disability is based upon a question which asks whether the respondent has a disability or suffers from poor health which limits the kind of paid work that can be undertaken. We use this information to estimate age-earnings profiles separately for men and women by six occupational groups and by disability (24 profiles in all). It is interesting to note at this stage that our results are consistent with those of a previous study on the labour market effects of disability and indicate a rather small effect on earnings growth. 41 This is not to say that disability has little effect on a lifetime's earnings.
On the contrary, lifetime earnings are substantially reduced by disability but the impact of disability is through lower starting wages and reduced employment prospects rather than through earnings growth. Of particular importance in the present context is the scarring effects of disability. 42 That is, even when a worker has recovered from a temporary disability, there is evidence of its history in future labour market outcomes.
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Estimating Employment Probabilities
In our above equations, annual wages are weighted by the probability that an individual will be in employment in the particular year in question. Chain we are able to capture the dynamic nature of the labour force, in particular the fact that workers often change activity status during their working lives.
We begin by explaining the data upon which we have based our estimates of employment probabilities. The LFS provides information for each person on current activity status and the individual's activity status 12 months earlier. To estimate transition probabilities for someone initially in employment we calculate the likelihood that an individual of a stated age who was in employment 12 months ago is still in employment, the likelihood that this individual has become unemployed and the likelihood that this individual has become inactive. This process can be continued until the expected age of retirement from the workforce. These transition probabilities are used to estimate employment probabilities at each age which are conditional on activity status and age at the time of injury. We call these conditional employment probabilities.
Conditional employment probabilities are calculated separately for males and females, able-bodied and disabled and by initial activity status for all starting ages from 16 to 65 years. The volume of material documenting the estimated employment 46 A Markov Chain model is a useful conceptual device for describing, analysing and forecasting stochastic processes such as lifetime employment where the probability of transition to a future labour market state is dependent on the current state.
probabilities is considerable (12 tables each containing 50 columns) and precludes useful commentary.
In the following section we apply our alternative method of calculation of loss of future earnings to an adjudicated case. The purpose is twofold: first to provide a worked example using the alternative method and, secondly, to illustrate the key points of difference with the current method of calculation.
A CASE STUDY APPLICATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY
The case involved a 23 year old carpenter earning £7,800 a year net who suffered an injury to his non-dominant hand in 1991. He previously had suffered from no ill-health or disability, and during the seven years of his pre-injury working life had been out of work for only four months. However, his accident resulted in a resid ual disability which restricted his ability to manipulate objects and lift heavy items. He was forced to give up his job, and for the three years between his injury and trial he was continuously unemployed. Although the court found that he had future earning potential, it was thought that he would never be able to resume work as a carpenter. For his future earnings loss alone he received damages of £62,216.
This was calculated using a multiplier of 16, representing the period of his earnings loss until he reached retirement age in 39 years time. This overall multiplier was apportioned to three separate multiplicands representing three distinct periods with different annual losses. Typical of cases tried before Wells v Wells, the court applied a discount rate of 4.5 per cent, and used its discretion to assess pre-injury labour market risks rather than adhere precisely to the Ogden Tables deductions for non Tables in respect of the multiplier and the associated deduction for pre-injury labour market risks, we calculated the award for future loss of earnings for this case based upon a strict Ogden calculation. 49 Discounting the pre-injury remaining 39 years of potential working life for early receipt (at a discount rate of 4.5 per cent) and for the risk of premature death, yields a multiplier of 18. This is reduced to 17.6 to take account of pre-injury labour market risks, 50 and results in compensation for future loss of earnings being £66,519. This is only £3,303 more than the court award based upon a multiplier of 16. The difference between the two awards arises from a difference in the calculation of pre-injury labour market risks. According to the court's calculation, in the absence of injury, the claimant would have faced an 11 per cent chance of unemployment whereas the deduction specified in the Ogden Tables for pre-injury labour market risks is, in effect, only 2 per cent.
We now come to our alternative calculation based upon the equation we previously established. 51 It calculates the difference between the claimant's predicted pre-and post-injury earnings by measuring the earnings in each year of the claimant's future working life, taking into account both individual and economywide real earnings growth, and making a downward adjustment to account for an estimated probability of employment in each year. Discounts are then made for early receipt and for premature death 52 on the same bases as employed by the court.
Pre-injury net earnings at trial were valued by the court as £8,169. For each later year these earnings are increased by:-1) the average rate of growth of real earnings over the working life (ageearnings profile) of an able-bodied male craftsman estimated from LFS earnings data, and 49 We use the Ogden Tables (2  nd ed , 1993) op cit which were available to the court at the time of the trial in 1994. 50 Ibid. See tables in section C of the Explanatory Notes. 51 See above note 39. 52 We use the mortality rates used by the court and contained in the Ogden Tables  (2  nd ed 2) a 2 per cent economy-wide growth.
In each year this potential earnings figure is reduced by the conditional employment probability estimated from LFS transition rates into employment, unemployment or inactivity for an able-bodied man who was in employment at the age of 23 years (age at accident).
Post-injury net earnings at trial are valued by the court at £5,049. Using the same method of calculation a s for pre-injury future earnings, post-injury earnings at trial are increased in subsequent years by the rate of growth of real earnings over the working life but this time for a male unskilled employee who is disabled, and a 2 per cent economy-wide growth. In each year the potential earnings figure is reduced by the conditional employment probability which is estimated from transition rates into employment, unemployment or inactivity for a disabled man who is unemployed at the age of 26 years (time of trial). Economy-wide earnings growth is not always included in the USA and, excluding this component from the calculation, reduces the alternative award to £91,924, but this is still 1½ times the actual award made by the court.
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The differences between the court and the alternative awards are substantial and represent the cumulative effect of ignoring earnings growth and of understating the difficulties faced by a job seeker disabled through injury. Wage growth is particularly important in this case because the earnings of an able-bodied craftsman at the beginning of his career grow at a faster rate than those of a disabled unskilled employee in light work. Furthermore, the court is too optimistic about the postinjury employment prospects for this unemployed disabled former carpenter. In effect, the court has estimated that he will be out of work for 5½ years of the discounted 16 years, an average unemployment rate of 34 per cent. In fact, using conditional employment probabilities in each year from the age of 26 to 65 years, we This case study illustrates both the application of the alternative method and the potential for variation in the levels of compensation between the two methods.
The result here is that the alternative method based on the same base earnings, the same discount rate and the same adjustment for premature death doubles the award made by the court. Of itself, this difference does not necessarily imply that substantial under-compensation in the existing system is a generalised phenomenon.
However, in the next section we take a broader approach by examining the damages awarded in 108 adjudicated cases and comparing them with our alternative calculations.
EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF AWARDS The Cases In The Survey
To examine the differences between awards calculated under the alternative method and those calculated by the courts, we examined in detail a sample of 108 cases tried between 1990 and 1998 in which an award for future loss of earnings was adjudicated. 55 Our sample of cases was compiled from two sources. First, just under half of the cases were taken from reported judgements. However, relatively few reports deal with the computation of future loss of earnings, and often they do not provide sufficient detail about the relevant economic variables. We therefore also sought, by appeal to practitioners, transcripts of judgements of unreported cases. Full case papers relating to these unreported trials were made available to us by a wide range of solicitors from law firms throughout England and Wales. We recognise the potential difficulties involved in accepting cases from this self-reporting system.
Solicitors may refer cases which may reflect well upon them or in which they think their client may have been dealt with unfairly. However, we were not directly aware of our sample being affected in this way.
We must emphasise that our sample of cases is not representative of tort cases in general. This is because the vast majority of personal injury claims involve minor injuries and damages of less than £5,000. 56 Our focus is exclusively upon 55 Full details are contained in Working Paper No 2 op cit. 56 In 1995 the Department of Social Security estimated that half of the cases reported to it under the compensation recovery scheme were being settled for £2,500 or less. DSS Memorandum of Evidence to the Social Security Select Committee (1995) HC 196, para 40. Cf the figure of 37 per cent given 5 years earlier in H.C. Deb. vol 166, col. 942 (February 7, 1990 ). £2,500 was the median figure in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 1996 -97 in P. Pleasence, Report Of The damages for loss of future earnings and these are only likely to be awarded in the minority of cases involving serious injury. According to one estimate, this head of damages is only present in 5.5 per cent of all tort cases. 57 A second major difference between our sample and tort cases in general is that 99 per cent of the latter are settled out of court, 58 whereas all of our cases involve court determined awards. We cannot examine directly settlements out of court because they rarely involve complete agreement about the factors which determine the acceptance of the money on offer, and it is impossible to identify the actual process involved in reaching a particular outcome. Therefore the only way to examine the effect of applying the alternative method to the calculation of loss of future earnings is to look at court judgements recognising, of course, that judicial practice has a much wider effect in that it is of fundamental importance in disposing of cases which do not come to court.
Before we report the results of the comparative exercise, we provide a brief description of the claimants in the sample and the levels of compensation they were per cent were ethnically white. All age groups were represented although only four
claimants had yet to reach school-leaving age. The majority of claimants (87 per cent) had no pre-injury disability. Over half of the injured (58 per cent) were thought to be capable of work in the future. There are some interesting patterns in the sample data. Work-related injuries were more common amongst older claimants whereas road traffic accidents and injuries arising through clinical negligence are more common amongst those under the age of 30 years. Men were over-represented amongst those injured at work and on the road. On average women in the sample were more severely injured than men.
Nearly all claimants who had completed their education were employed prior to injury (96 per cent). Three claimants were unemployed and one was inactive.
Thirteen claimants had yet to begin their labour market careers. Employment rates 59 At the relevant period the Board assessed loss of future earnings using common law principles. 62 The zero is not a "missing value", there is a specific adjudication that the claimant is capable of securing employment at his previous wage for his remaining working life, and therefore suffers no loss. The case is that of a 48 year old fireman where an injury to his leg prevented him continuing his employment in the fire service. He had worked for the fire-service for 24 years, he had no transferable skills, he lived in a high unemployment locality and he had been unemployed during the four years between injury and trial. The highest award of compensation for losses in the labour market is a conventional multiplier-multipicand award made to a Managing Director. The multiplicand was just under £60,000 and was based upon the average earnings of a business executive.
As a test of whether the courts apply the multiplier-multiplicand method in a uniform and consistent way, we used base earnings, the number of potential remaining years to retirement, and future earnings potential as predictors of the award for loss of future earnings. These variables proved to be accurate predictors of the level of compensation. Furthermore, when details of the case (accident type, location of trial etc) and characteristics of the claimant (sex, ethnicity, occupation and education) were included, they had no additional predictive value. In other words, we found that courts were consistent in their award of damages for loss of future earnings and were not biased in any systematic way associated either with the case or with the claimant.
Comparison With Awards Calculated Using The Alternative Method
We now turn to the comparison of awards calculated using different methods. The table below reports a summary of the statistics which compare the court awards with damages calculated using two versions of our alternative method.
The focus is upon the differentials between the court awards and the alternatives.
The court award in column (i) is compared, first, in column (ii) with an alternative which includes age-related individual productivity growth and, secondly, in column (iii) with an award which includes both age-related and economy-wide productivity growth. The figures also distinguish men from women claimants, and separate those who were judged to have post-injury earnings potential from those who were not expected to return to work.
The differential between the alternative awards and those of the courts is a measure of the extent to which the current method of calculation under-compensates the claimant. A major finding of the survey is that, for the sample as a whole, the award calculated under the alternative method in column (iii), which includes both individual and economy-wide productivity growth, is nearly 2½ times that of the court award in column (i). If future national productivity growth is discounted, the alternative method in column (ii) still generates an award which is over 1½ times greater than that awarded by the court. 63 This was demonstrated in the case study where pre-injury average lifetime employment rate implied by the Ogden deduction is 98 per cent compared to that of 89 per cent using the alternative calculation.
Sex
If the differential between the court and the alternative awards in respect of men and women claimants are compared it might be thought that, on average, they are equally under-compensated by the court method. However, this is a misleading result which arises because the women claimants in our sample are younger than the men, and the differential is greater for those who are younger. Controlling for age reveals a particularly marked differential for men which reflects the courts' failure to make sufficient allowance for earnings growth over an individual's working life.
Although this under-compensation applies to both men and women, there is an offsetting effect which benefits women because courts generally do not make sufficient allowance for periods of inactivity on future employment rates. Women's disproportionate responsibilities in respect of childcare are reflected in the labour market in the form of reduced participation. In much the same way that inactivity due to ill health or unemployment have scarring effects on future labour market outcomes so the effects of career breaks and part-time work continue following reemployment after a period of childcare. The court method, even when based on the Ogden approach, does not fully account for these periods of inactivity or their aftereffects. The result is that, in this respect, women are over-compensated and this offsets the under-compensation from failing to make sufficient allowance for earnings growth.
Age
The differential between the court award and the alternative award increases with the number of potential years remaining in the labour market. In other words, the court method of calculation particularly under-compensates younger claimants. This is clear from the correlation between the differential and the claimant's age.
The correlation coefficient measures the extent to which two variables vary together.
We calculate the correlation coefficient separately for those with and without future earnings prospects and find that for both groups the relationship between age and the differential is strongly negative. The comparison of two variables in isolation can produce misleading results.
The apparent equality in the differential for men and women is an example of this.
This was in fact the result of the negative relationship between age and the differential, and that women in the sample tended to be younger than the men. When we systematically test for each of the above results using multivariate methods, each differential is significant after controlling for the effects of other correlates.
CONCLUSION
We have set out an alternative method for the calculation of loss of future earnings following personal injury. The method is founded upon labour market analysis and mirrors the most widely used practices of forensic economists in the USA. Its theoretical basis is easier to defend than that presently used by courts in the UK because it avoids subjective or arbitrary assumptions about labour market outcomes. The basis of this approach is that the path of future earnings can be approximated empirically using age-earnings profiles and trends in national earnings 64 Correlation coefficients are -0.71 and -0.46 respectively and are significant at the 1 per cent level.
growth, both of which show how earnings increase over a working lifetime. This stream of earnings is adjusted according to the changing probability of employment over the claimant's working life. The data for the alternative model are derived empirically from the Labour Force Survey. While fairly technical at the theoretical level, this approach is nevertheless amenable to the routine application of standard statistical tables, and therefore offers a viable alternative to the existing court method of calculation.
To measure the extent that the alternative method would make a difference in practice we compared its results with those produced in a sample of court adjudicated cases. We kept other variables, including base earnings, the discount rate and mortality rates, the same as those used by the courts. This enabled us to identify the impact on future earnings compensation of using the central apparatus of the alternative approach, namely age-earnings profiles and employment probabilities. The differential between the court awards and those calculated using our alternative method is not uniformly distributed across our sample of claimants. It is most significant for men, younger claimants, and those with post-injury earnings potential. It is the young who have more years of potentia l employment, and thus earnings growth, ahead of them. For women the absence of compensation for earnings growth is offset by the failure to allow for the effects of periods of inactivity on future employment rates.
In the last ten years or so a clear trend has been identified towards a more "scientific" approach in the assessment of damages. 65 Both the legislature and the judiciary have responded to calls for greater precision. The increasing ability of personal injury practitioners to understand and use the information provided to them by forensic accountants, actuaries and a panoply of other specialist advisors has fuelled important developments in tort law. 66 As a result spread sheets, inflation factors, discount and interest rates are not the mysteries they once were. One of the most notable developments has been the increased acceptance of the Ogden Tables by courts. Their routine use may make it appear that actuarial science has produced an accurate system for compensating, in particular, loss of future earnings. Certainly the Tables encourage a more However, whether the damages award should therefore be increased to take account of this under-compensation is a policy matter which goes beyond the scope of the present article. Our research findings do not have to be interpreted as necessarily supporting a substantia l rise in damages awards. 67 We recognise that in some quarters there is considerable concern about present damages levels, and in particular, about their effects upon the NHS. Indeed the tort system has been seen as compensating only the fortunate few, and disabled organisations in the past have opposed increasing damages awards because this would only make "an 66 Lewis, "Increasing the Price of Pain: Damages, the Law Commission and Heil v Rankin" (2001) 64 MLR 100. 67 Although the find ings may prompt claimants' representatives to campaign for further increases in damages, there are alternative perspectives upon the tort system which would not support such a campaign. For example, the limited importance and inefficiency of tort could be emphasised in that it compensates but few people and at a very high administrative cost. The great majority of accident victims are unable to claim and must be content with receiving limited social security benefits. Successful tort claimants are distinguished on the basis of haphazard and inconsistent principles of liability which, in practice, achieve capricious results. If a decision were to be made to increase the resources to be made available to disabled people, many would not target the money at a group already receiving the highest benefits. The tort system may be seen as impeding the development of a more coherent compensation regime based upon the extent of disability rather than its cause. It is in such wider contexts that the present under-compensation of tort claimants is not seen as justifying an increase in damages awards.
elite even more elite." Our research should instead be interpreted only as revealing that the tort system fails to satisfy one of its main objectives in that it does not provide "full" compensation. The claimant is not returned as closely as possible to the pre-accident position. The rhetoric of the system with regard to damages, as is so often also the case when wrongdoing and "fault" are considered, is not matched by its reality.
